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S E C R E T STATE 097389

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2033  
TAGS: [EFIN](#) [FR](#) [GM](#) [IR](#) [IS](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [SZ](#) [UK](#)  
SUBJECT: REVISED: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD  
CORPS OFFICIALS TO GERMAN AND SWISS UNDERGROUND  
CONSTRUCTION FIRMS

Classified By: ISN PDAS PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY  
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

11. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

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SUMMARY  
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12. (S) Representatives of an Iranian underground construction company affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) planned to visit underground equipment manufacturers in Germany and Switzerland from 14 to 26 April 12008. The U.S. would like to inform Germany and Switzerland of this visit, urge appropriate authorities in those countries to investigate such contacts, and to take steps to freeze any accounts held or transactions conducted in support of proliferation-related activities.

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OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST  
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13. (S//NF) Posts are requested to pursue the following objectives:

- Alert host government officials to information we have about planned commercial contacts between companies in their jurisdictions and an IRGC-affiliated company.
- Remind host governments that the IRGC was designated under U.S. Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 on October 25, 2007 for its involvement in proliferation-related activities. Many IRGC-related individuals have also been designated by the UN Security Council in Resolutions 1737 and 1747 for their involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
- Urge appropriate authorities to investigate whether these meetings took place and end any commercial or financial relationships that host country's firms may have with IRGC-affiliated entities and individuals to ensure that the IRGC does not facilitate proliferation-related activities in the jurisdiction of host countries, in circumvention of UNSC sanctions.

This cable was originally issued as STATE 095843 and is being reissued to correct classification markings. Post may leave the points in paragraph 4 with host government interlocutor as a SECRET//REL non-paper.

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BACKGROUND AND NONPAPER  
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14. (S//REL GERMANY, SWITZERLAND) FOR GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND ONLY:

-- We would like to inform you of possible Iranian financial activities that could aid Iran's proliferation efforts.

(S//REL FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL) FOR FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL ONLY:

-- In the spirit of our cooperation on countering Iran's proliferation-related activities, we are sharing this information in order to keep you as informed as possible whenever new information comes to light on different methods, routes, or tactics Iran is employing to advance its proliferation activities and potentially evade sanctions placed upon it by the UN Security Council. We believe sharing this information will help build support for our shared goal of disrupting and impeding Iran's efforts to facilitate proliferation-related activities.

(S//REL GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL) FOR GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, UK, AND ISRAEL:

-- Representatives of an Iranian underground construction company affiliated with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) planned to visit underground equipment manufacturers in Germany and Switzerland from 14 to 26 April 2008.

-- The itinerary for this trip included visits to German companies Wirth, Herrenknecht, Muhlhauser, and Swiss company Rowa.

-- As you know, the IRGC was designated under U.S. Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 on October 25, 2007 for its involvement in proliferation-related activities. Many IRGC-related individuals have also been designated by the UN Security Council in Resolutions 1737 and 1747 for their involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

-- Considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is charged by the Iranian Constitution to protect the theocracy, defend the clerical regime against internal and external threats, and aid oppressed Muslims throughout the world. It is the chief defender of the ideals of the Iranian Revolution and is part of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's powerbase. The IRGC is composed of five branches (air, ground, naval, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations) overseen by a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic interests involving defense production and construction.

-- The IRGC has not been shy in its public statements about its willingness to engage in the proliferation of the WMD-capable missiles it controls. The IRGC's missile inventory includes the Shahab-1, 2 and 3 missiles, all of which could be used to deliver WMD. The IRGC has broad links to Iran's ballistic missile programs and is one of the primary regime organizations tied to developing and testing the Shahab-3 program. The IRGC attempted as recently as 2006 to procure sophisticated and costly equipment that could be used to support Iran's missile and nuclear programs.

-- UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 require States to freeze the assets of entities and individuals that are designated in the annexes of those resolutions, as well as to freeze the assets of entities and individuals that are acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or entities that are owned or controlled by, those designated entities.

-- We urge you to investigate whether these meetings took place, to encourage an end to any commercial or financial relationships that your country's firms have with IRGC-affiliated entities and individuals, and to ensure that the IRGC does not facilitate proliferation-related activities in your jurisdiction in circumvention of UNSC sanctions.

-- We look forward to working with you on this and other related security and counter-proliferation matters, and are prepared to provide additional assistance as appropriate.

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REPORTING DEADLINE  
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¶5. (U) Please report delivery of the U.S. non-paper and any response within seven days of receipt of this cable. Please slug replies for EUR, ISN, T, TREASURY, and NEA/IR. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses.

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POINT OF CONTACT  
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¶6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5408, McGeehanKJ@state.sgov.gov.

¶7. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.  
RICE